The JFK assassination, Vietnam, and the path not taken

The following op-ed was published in the New Bedford Standard-Times this morning.

A half-century has elapsed since that cold Dallas day when President John F. Kennedy was murdered.  Even now, these events continue to capture our imagination.  Why?  Surely some of it stems from the energy and charisma of the young President himself.  Few things shock us more than seeing someone cut down in their prime, their great promise unfulfilled. 

Much like 9/11 for Americans of this century, Kennedy’s seemingly inexplicable murder inspired an almost existential sense of national and individual vulnerability.  But it also marked a profound change in our national story.   One rarely finds anyone who lived through the events of November 1963 that does not think that something profoundly changed in their wake.   

The next five years brought a remarkable expansion of equality and freedom, including an end to racial apartheid in the South.  Kennedy’s successor was ultimately better suited to help with this extraordinary change.  But those five years also included a brutal and unnecessary war, an exponential increase in government dishonesty, and a blunt and still-unresolved confrontation with racial inequality in the urban North.   

And then in 1968, the two public figures that seemed most capable of redeeming the national promise of peace and justice followed JFK to the grave in bloody fashion.

Many historians also believe that JFK’s death was a watershed moment, particularly with regard to Vietnam.    

Exactly two years before that fateful day in Dallas, Kennedy signed National SecurityAction Memorandum 111.  In it, he authorized a significant increase in the American advisory effort in South Vietnam.  He also stepped up aid to the embattled Diem regime, which was under increasing attack not only by Communist-led guerrillas, but also by a large percentage of the broader population.  This document would seem to support the arguments of those who credit Kennedy with starting the Vietnam War.  But if we dig a little deeper, we begin to discern the hazy outlines of another path – one brutally cut short in Dallas. 

One week prior to issuing NSAM 111, on November 15^th 1961, Kennedy met with his advisers.  They were convinced that Kennedy needed to send troops to Vietnam, immediately – as many as 205,000.   

Only 10 months into his first term, Kennedy had already been sorely tested by Cold War emergencies in Cuba and Berlin.  There had been more failure than success.   

But to his credit, Kennedy had also learned from these experiences.  The Bay of Pigs fiasco taught him to question unstated assumptions, particularly about the utility and necessity of deploying military power, when any conflict threatened nuclear holocaust.  His reading of history told him that once loosed, the dogs of war could quickly escape the control of even reasonable men.   

As a consequence, despite a united front among his advisers, Kennedy responded to the call for troops in Vietnam with an emphatic ‘no.’   “The war in Vietnam could be won only so long as it was their war,” he told an aide privately.  “If it were ever converted into a white man’s war, we would lose.”

Kennedy certainly did not retreat from Vietnam in the next two years.  And the documents don’t tell us definitively what he intended to do, when he boarded the plane for Dallas.  It’s not clear even he knew.  Had he returned to Washington unharmed, would he have committed over 500,000 troops to Vietnam, as Lyndon Johnson ultimately did?   

We will never know.  But Kennedy’s hard-won practical wisdom, demonstrated most clearly two years earlier, gives us some hope that the awful, wasting tragedy of the Vietnam War could have been avoided.  And with it, the mortal blow that conflict dealt to the legitimacy of our civic institutions, our sense of national purpose, and our moral standing in the world.  Not far from where Kennedy’s body was laid to rest stands a memorial to the almost 60,000 Americans who died in that conflict.  On the other side of the world one finds comparable memorials to the over 2 million people who died in ‘the American War.’  When this historian mourns the events of November 1963, it is this road not taken that I will have in mind.  I suspect I will not be the only one.    

Preview of tonight's foreign policy debate

I do plan to live blog the foreign policy debate tonight, but I want to preface my comments and reactions a little bit -- first, because there are things I think we have to keep in mind in order to fully make sense of what goes on this evening, and second, because my own views may require a fuller explanation, which I cannot provide when the clock is ticking.

First:  if you think this debate is Obama's to lose, because of his experience, his knowledge, and his successes -- I think you are mistaken.  Romney is the one with the advantages here.  A bigger man would hesitate to exploit some of those advantages, for reasons of national security.

Romney is not that man.

Second:  I think that by and large, Obama has had the most successful foreign policy of any American president in decades.  I expect everyone on the right to disagree with me on that -- but I also expect many of my allies on the left to disagree, too.

Why do I think Romney has the advantage tonight?

Because Obama is the president -- and because Obama is who he is, and Romney is who HE is.  What Obama says becomes, in effect, a statement of American policy.  As a consequence, he must be guarded in what he says, and will often be unable to provide full explanations for his positions for reasons of diplomatic strategy and national security.  Obama, as we know, is a man who values the meaning of words, and measures them very carefully (this is why he is fond of the teleprompter).  He is a writer, and a constitutional lawyer, and it is reflected in the measured language he tends to deploy, and the pragmatic and process-focused approach he uses to the world.  He is in many ways the ideal president for the country to have at the moment, as we seek to re-familiarize ourselves with the cultivation and use of soft power after a decade in the self-destructive manichean wilderness.

Romney really has no restrictions whatsoever on what he can say tonight, save what his conscience and political instincts tell him are inappropriate.  There was a time, not too long ago, when presidential challengers knew that there were certain kinds of issues, questions, and discussions that had to be put aside during the election season.  Our times are different, and Romney doesn't seem like the sort of candidate who would honor such limits anyway.  He has already demonstrated that he doesn't care whether his arguments directly contradict his prior statements.  He also doesn't particularly care whether what he says is logical, reasonable, or truthful.  I'm guessing he also doesn't care that the consequence of attempting to corner Obama into a belligerent 'if-then' statement might be a dramatic narrowing of our national options, with regard to a nuclear Iran in particular.  Romney is even more likely to shake the etch-a-sketch on foreign policy than on domestic policy, since the ignorance of the remaining persuadable voters on world politics is extensive to say the least.

Let's make this more concrete.  Romney is likely to push -- hard -- on two inter-related issues tonight:  the prospect of a nuclear Iran, and the commitment of the U.S. to Israel's national security.  He has the luxury of bellicosity on both of them.  Even if Romney were tempted to rein this in for moral or intellectual reasons, the political benefits to saber-rattling will be too tempting for him to ignore, especially because Obama cannot responsibly match him.

Tonight, Romney will attempt to draw a 'line in the sand,' and draw Obama into making a definitive statement that we will never tolerate a nuclear Iran.  He will do the same with Israel, by trying to depict Obama as someone who would throw Israel under the bus to avoid military conflict with Iran.

Obama cannot join him in the drawing of such lines.  If he does, I'm going to come down on him like a ton of bricks, because he will be betraying the restraint, balance and realism that have led to his foreign policy success.  It will be the functional equivalent of a wartime president saying 'defeat is not an option.'  Of course its an option -- it always is -- and one must always leave room to maneuver in case it becomes the most likely one.  A nation, like an alliance (Israel!), is not a suicide pact.

Obama cannot responsibly take the bait.  If, in refusing to take it, he can appear more reasonable, responsible and knowledgeable than Romney -- if he can make the case that there are outcomes in the world that the United States does not have the power, even the right, to determine -- he can turn these exchanges to his advantage.  But it will be exceedingly difficult to do, because of the logical and emotional simplicity of the policy choices that Romney will present.  Romney will try to make this into Munich, and will make Obama's attempts to qualify and complicate the situation into something that sounds like waffling and appeasement, rather than a reasoned judgment based on a full understanding of the limits of American power in general, and military power in particular.

Obama, of course, could respond by being bluntly honest.  He could say that a war with Iran -- following quickly upon the worst foreign policy blunder in the nation's history, in Iraq -- would be an unmitigated disaster for the United States, and for Israel.  It would almost certainly grease the already slippery slope toward American national decline.  And he could conclude this response by saying that a nuclear Iran is inevitable, and we must begin to the lay the groundwork now for dealing with it, by establishing a diplomatic structure to prevent an arms race in the region.  Since Israel already has nuclear weapons, perhaps some kind of stasis can be obtained. 

But he can't say any of this, because he is the president.  Does Obama know that we probably can't prevent Iran from developing nuclear materials, and weaponizing it?  Of course -- he must.  He knows that is an option, even the most likely one.  Does Obama know that a military strike on Iran would be an unmitigated disaster?  Surely.  But he cannot say so publicly, for fear of losing whatever leverage the US still might have over Iran's rulers.  But he also can't follow Romney into the corner, because he will eliminate his room for maneuver should he get re-elected.

Romney will tell the country that the most important foreign policy threat facing the country is the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.  I believe the most important foreign policy threat facing the country is the possibility that our own domestic politics (and the irresponsible behavior of Israel) might lead us into a military conflict with Iran.  I'm quite certain that President Obama holds a position closer to mine.  But he's going to have a devil of a time trying to make that argument during the debate, without being depicted by his opponent as an appeaser, and a betrayer of our Israeli ally.

Second, you can discern my foreign policy views from what I've written above.  I'm including a few paragraphs on this, because some of my comments during the debate tonight will probably be disagreeable to some of my friends on the left.

I believe Obama has been our most successful foreign policy president in decades, because my study of American history tells me that it is far easier to start wars, than to finish them.  Some military conflicts have easily definable goals -- the definition of victory, if not the path to it, is clear.  Victory in World War II was going to ultimately require the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.  Victory in Korea was going to require the preservation of the territorial integrity of South Korea.  One might also call these 'necessary wars,' though obviously the case is much clearer for the former than the latter.

Iraq and Afghanistan more clearly resemble the Vietnam War, than these other conflicts.  In each case, we were ostensibly trying to pursue political goals through military means -- they were wars of choice, in other words.  In each case, both the definition of and timetable for victory was essentially left in the hands of either our enemies, our local allies -- or both.  And in each case, little to no effort was made to assess whether the price (in blood, treasure, reputation, domestic civility, and opportunity costs) was ultimately worth it, until we began to seek an exit.

I'll have more to say about this in a future post, but I maintain that the invasion of Iraq was the worst foreign policy blunder in the history of the United States.  And I say that with an expert's knowledge of the Vietnam War, which was a far more bloody and destructive conflict.  While over 2 million people (59,000 Americans) were killed in Vietnam, and it bitterly divided the country and stressed the federal budget and the economy, it had no appreciable impact on the nation's strategic position, its military capabilities, or its national security.

The invasion of Iraq, in contrast, fundamentally and perhaps permanently changed the position of the United States in the region, and in the world.  It also greatly weakened the possibility of success in Afghanistan, while strengthening the one nation in the region willing and able to check American power (Iran).  40 years from now, when historians write about the first decade of the 21st century, they will likely mark the acceleration of American national decline to the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the manner in which the war and its aftermath were prosecuted.

Obama inherited TWO of these wars of choice -- oh, and the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression.  And to make the task of winding these conflicts that much more challenging, Obama was the leader of a political party that had been repeatedly hammered from the right since the late 1940s for lacking the stomach to fight and win wars.

Obama nonetheless undertook the detailed strategic assessment that his predecessor should have engaged in before these invasions took place, and did so with what I believe was an admirable sense of the limits of American power.  The preeminent foreign policy goal of the first Obama Administration had to be the marking of a clear exit path from both Iraq and Afghanistan.  While those of us on the left may lament how slow the wind down has been -- particularly from Afghanistan, where the initial response was to increase the number of US troops -- we must not forget the enormity of this task.  Lyndon Johnson kept throwing America's young men into the volcano that was Vietnam, too cowardly to admit that victory was not possible, too cowardly to accept that sometimes tactical retreat is the only wise path.  Richard Nixon, not wanting to be the "first president to lose a war," ran for president in 1968 claiming to have a 'secret plan' to end the war...and then sent over 30,000 Americans to their deaths in Southeast Asia, with the full knowledge that victory was not possible. 

Obama finished the work of winding down the war in Iraq, so that the nation's resources (financial, military, diplomatic) could be concentrated on extracting ourselves from Afghanistan in as satisfactory a manner as possible.  Initially, this required resourcing US forces there -- the 'Afghan surge' -- in order move the status quo to a place where a timetabled exit was possible.  This was not nation-building, Bush style, though some on the left have said as much.  The Afghan surge was not about 'victory.'  It was about getting out.  If you doubt this, read some of the reporting by Woodward and others on Obama's decision making in the late summer and early fall of 2009.  The deliberations included detailed discussions of the Vietnam War, of the limits of military power, and of a timetable to leave.  Some in the administration argued against any kind of surge at all; others, mostly the devotees of the religion of 'counter-insurgency,' hoped to use the surge to launch an ambitious test-case for nation building.  Almost everyone, other than the president, resisted the idea of a timetable -- a date.  Obama was so adamant that the surge had to be in service to a time table to withdraw, that he ultimately settled the internal debate by writing a 10 paged single-spaced brief one night on just what he was agreeing to...and got all the major advisers to sign it.

As my friends on the left will rightfully point out, part of this process of clearing a path to the exit from Afghanistan has been the use of drones there and in Pakistan, often resulting in the deaths of civilians.  But to me, as long as Obama is able to keep his eye on the prize here -- it must only be a tool to facilitate what will ultimately be a much smaller American footprint -- I think its a call a pragmatic American president has to make.

And so, our military role in Afghanistan will come to an end, too, as it has in Iraq.  If you do not think that the implementation of two tactical retreats constitutes an ENORMOUS foreign policy accomplishment, I will remind you once again of the failures of his predecessors when confronted with similar moral and strategic dilemmas.  I believe it is the greatest foreign policy accomplishment of any American president in nearly a half century.

And of course, Obama's sense of limits -- he is an avid reader of Niebuhr, recall -- has extended to the rest of his foreign policy as well.  If the situation with a nuclear Iran comes to a head in the next 4 years, it is absolutely essential that we have someone like Obama in charge.

But do you think Obama can explain all of this in a debate, when Romney hammers him repeatedly about killing the bad guys?  God help us all if he can't.  Romney is surrounded by the same neo-conservatives that Bush was.

A military draft, part 2

I have received lots of email responses to my previous post, on whether we should consider a military draft. below, i've tried to put together my reaction -- incorporating objections, tweaking arguments, and reconsidering some things. thanks, all of you.

thinking about this issue is tying my moral intestines (and to some extent the real ones) in knots. i did say in my piece that a bush victory (or electoral theft) in november changes things for me with regard to the draft and iraq. as i read emails from others like yourself, i'm beginning to move toward the position that there should not be any kind of draft whatsoever for THIS particular conflict -- but that when it is over (or when the US is out), we've got to have some kind of public reckoning, a real discussion of why this war happened, and how we want to orient ourselves to the rest of the world in the era of terrorism. a draft has to be a part of that discussion, i think.

my great fear with the draft (and part of why i'm so conflicted over it) is that the idiocy of patriotism will just make the draft a source of more cannon fodder for the continuation of the same policies. if our leaders are bent on empire, and they are good enough liars and manipulators of political symbols and the reins of government to fool the American people into drafting its children for more wars of pre-emption and messianic destruction, then all a draft will do is accelerate our journey as a nation and a democracy down into the wormhole. I guess i'm betting, hesitantly, on the American people not being so gullible. or, i'm betting on the ability of those who love peace to persuade those who think peace isn't possible. if we have a draft (or even a public discussion of one), it will vastly increase the pressure on our political figures before, during and after any military adventures. and it won't take years, like it did in Vietnam. information from around the world is too readily accessible today, and far more Americans have a built-in skepticism of war, foreign policy, and our 'elected' leaders today than was the case during Vietnam. Congress is not some Solon-like deliberative body; it is, in the main, a group of rich white cowards. they do understand votes, however. for libertarian reasons alone, the possibility of an impending draft will cause the political sh*t to hit the fan, right quick...

and i do want to address a point a number of folks have raised -- do i have the right to discuss a draft as a possibility, when i am past draft age (i'm 37), and my present and future children haven't reached it yet? well, a future draft would certainly touch me in a concrete way: i spend most of my waking hours with young men and women between the ages of 18 and 24 -- hundreds of them every academic year. I become very fond of many of them; remain in touch with many of them, years after they've left school. they babysit my kids; they provide me joy (and frustration!), and give a great deal of meaning to my life. i'm not blind to the human costs of this. but i feel like we who love peace, and who care to trouble those who would rule over us, are stuck between a rock and hard place. if we have to have a military, and must occasionally go to war, how do we do it? Iraq provides us a ringingly clear example of how NOT to do it. how do we avoid future Iraqs?

i do want to be clear that i am not advocating a draft because i think it will end this war, and thus i'm willing to sacrifice the lives of others for this purpose. I have read some people in the anti-war movement who will bluntly argue for the draft as a means to this end. i do happen to think, from observing american history and american politics, that the launching of future wars will have a totally different process (and may not even happen at all, or as frequently) if war automatically triggers a draft. my reasons for considering a draft really have to do with one question: how should a democracy, with a civilian-controlled military, involve itself in modern war? how can we make war a very last resort for our political leaders, and for those american citizens who like their patriotism drenched in the blood of others? how can we ensure that when we do go to war (or fight to defend ourselves), that the reasons for doing so are publicly considered, and that the burden of doing so isn't placed on the backs of the working-class alone? how can we ensure that their deaths don't become anonymous (they won't even let us see the coffins, for god's sake)? or that the actions they take in places halfway across the world are not taken in our name and again anonymously, inspiring hatred of America that blows back to us years down the line, ensuring the repetition of this cycle of death again?

one of the unintended consequences of even discussing a proposed draft is that it might broaden the realization among americans of just how dangerous, unfeeling, and unaccountable this administration is. i can only hope that we can have that debate, and remove him and cheney from office, without actually having to implement a draft. but while i do see some form of draft in the long-term as something we need to consider, if this Administration is re-elected, and it somehow convinced Congress to initiate a draft to continue its prosecution of the war in Iraq, and its policies of pre-emption and empire more generally...well, i'm going to jail, somehow. in vietnam, LBJ and Nixon continued to throw our young people into the volcano long after they knew we couldn't stop the eruptions. we know we can't stop the eruptions in iraq already, before we even have a draft. it would be morally abhorent to initiate a draft while this president is in place, and without a drastic change in policy. but in the future, we DO need, i believe, to have an open and honest conversation in this country about our role in the post-cold war world, and the place of the military within it.

the larger question that we still have to address somehow is this: if we assume, as i think we unfortunately must, that this nation will fight wars in the future (most of them unjustified, if history is a guide), how can we ensure that the decisions are made democratically, that the full moral cost of a possible war is discussed and considered, and that the burden of war isn't carried by a small, unrepresentative, and relatively powerless minority, as it has been in the past? how can we minimize the frequency of American wars, and increase the possibility of solutions to world problems that are peaceful, just and multilateral? i honestly don't know the answer -- or i should say i don't really like the answer i come up with, which is a draft. how does a democracy keep a civilian controlled military, and fight modern wars when necessary? we can't keep on the way things are going now. something has to change. maybe the answer lies outside of all this -- in campaign finance reform, in building alliances between the peace movement and movements for economic justice, in revolution? i'm desperate. we're desperate.

what answer do i really want to give? that i don't accept the premise of the inevitability of war. but realistically, unless and until people like Dennis Kucinich are running this country, i just don't see that happening. we are a long, long way from the kind of cultural and moral transformation in this country that would be needed for us to choose peace, always and everywhere. i don't think a draft is a magic bullet to stop this war, or any other one. we must keep on writing, talking, marching, and going to jail to prevent our leaders addiction to the use of military force to solve all problems from holding sway. i just think that an equitable draft -- even if it is just a possibility -- will force all of us to decide: do we REALLY want to send our kids abroad to kill and die, because our leaders tell us it is patriotic to do so? if there is inevitably a burden to be carried, who should carry it? most Americans seem to be comfortable allowing a volunteer, professional military carry it, and our politicians to keep us blissfully unaware of the moral costs of that burden. but we can't go on like that. i don't know if a draft will stop it, but a public discussion of it might.

peace